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This paper creates a new series of the FOMC’s Target for the federal funds rate for the 
period September 27, 1982 through December 31, 1993.  The creation of this series was 
motivated by Thornton (2005).  Analyzing the verbatim transcripts of the FOMC, 
Thornton finds that most of the FOMC believed they began targeting the funds rate even 
before it deemphasized M1’s role in the Fed’s daily operating procedure.  The new series 
was constructed using the verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings, the FOMC Blue Book, 
the Report of Open Market Operations and Money Market Conditions, and data that the 
author obtained from the Desk for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York dealing with 
open market operations over the period March 1984 through December 1996.  The new 
series compared with another widely used series presented in Thornton and Wheelock 
(2000).  There are some differences in the dating and magnitude of target changes 
between the two series prior to but not after October 1989. 
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The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  I would like to thank 
Mattew Luecke, for providing me with some of the Blue Books and the Report of Open Market Operations 
and Andrei Sirchenko for helpful comments. This paper reports a new series for the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate 
beginning with the September 27, 1982 conference call.  This target series is constructed 
using four sources—the verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings, the Blue Book (BB), the 
Report of Open Market Operations and Money Market Conditions (ROMO), and data that 
the author obtained from the Desk for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Desk 
Data) concerning open market operations over the period March 1984 through December 
1996. 
The BB is prepared prior to each meeting by the staff of the Board of Governors.  
It typically presents three policy options.
1  For each option the staff suggested the funds 
rate which it believed was consistent with each alternative for the borrowing objective, 
referred to here as the initial borrowing assumption (IBA).  Committee members 
frequently express their positions by stating their preference for one of the BB 
alternatives.  More often than not, the transcripts are clear about the IBA.  In these 
instances, the FOMC discussion and the BB usually provide a clear indication of the 
implied funds rate associated with a particular level of the IBA.  There are two reasons 
for caution, however.  First, it is sometimes the case that the IBA is stated as a range, 
e.g., $300 to $400 million, rather than a specific level.  In these instances and before 
March 1984, IBA is assumed to be the mid-point of the range.  After March of 1984 the 
level of the IBA is obtained from the Desk Data.  Second, the BB is prepared several days 
prior to FOMC meetings—most often the Friday prior to a Tuesday meeting.  When 
conditions in the funds market are exceptionally fluid, it is possible that the funds rate 
                                                 
1 During the period from September 1982 through June 1988 with the exception of the November 1984 
meeting the Blue Book presented three options.  These options can be characterized as reducing, 
maintaining, or increasing the existing degree of reserve pressure.  More frequently occasions after that 
August 1988 two options were presented, maintaining the existing degree of reserve pressure and either 
increasing or decreasing depending on the economic circumstances at the time. 
  1implied by a given IBA in the BB could be updated at the meeting.  In such instances, and 
where possible, the rate suggested at the meeting rather than the rate suggested by the BB 
is used. 
There are also some instances where the transcript is unclear about the IBA 
adopted by the Committee.  Until the late 1980s this usually arose because the FOMC 
discussion involved a range for the IBA and some individuals discussed alternative 
ranges or desired levels at the meeting.  Ambiguity about the IBA used in open market 
operations is resolved by the ROMO and/or by the Desk Data after March 1984. 
The most serious problem arises because most target changes did not occur at an 
FOMC meeting.  The practice of the chairman making intermeeting policy adjustments 
occurred early in the new operating procedure is reflected in the exchange at the March 
26-27, 1984, FOMC meeting when President Boykin inquired “Technically, Mr. 
Chairman, can the borrowing assumption be changed other than by the Committee?”  
Volcker answered, “We change it all the time.”  Apparently surprised by the Chairman’s 
answer, Boykin responded, “All the time?”  Volcker went on to say that they would 
adjust it week to week, but given a sense of what the directive says, they would “change 
it if the money supply were coming in stronger and business remained strong or 
whatever.”  In an apparent attempt at clarification, President Boehne interjected, “I think 
what you’re saying is that you are going to look through the borrowings to the funds 
rate—not that you would be fixing the funds rate, but that with all this uncertainty one is 
not oblivious to what happens to it.”  Volcker responded, “Not oblivious, that’s right.  If I 
had a sense that we were getting a lot more tightness out of this than I judge we were 
  2really looking for, we would redo it.  That I can assure you.  You may certainly take it for 
granted that if there were a little easing out of it, we would adjust it.”
2 
Intermeeting adjustments of the funds rate target are more difficult to identify.  
They are principally identified by analyzing the wording of the ROMO.  Also, because 
the BB frequently begins with a discussion of operations since the last meeting, 
intermeeting changes can sometimes be verified by analyzing the BB.  Unfortunately, 
since the Fed was officially targeting borrowed reserves and not the funds rate, the 
language of the ROMO (and the BB) with respect to the funds rate target is sometimes 
fuzzy.  When the ROMO indicates a target different from the previous ROMO and the 
IBA was changed for other than “technical” reasons, I assume that the target had been 
changed.  The IBA was not always changed when the target was changed, however.  In 
these instances, more discretion is required.  Working on the assumption that the staff is 
very careful in choosing its words, I assumed that phraseology is important.  If the 
ROMO states that “this degree of reserve pressure was expected to be associated with 
Federal funds trading around X percent,” or similar phraseology to suggest the funds rate 
was a consequence of the degree of reserve pressure the Desk was going to pursue during 
the period, I assumed that the target was changed.  There are a few exceptions, however.  
These occur when there is contradictory information suggesting that the target was not 
changed.  In instances where the ROMO merely stated that “it was expected that Federal 
funds would trade around X percent” or similar phraseology, I was inclined to believe 
that the ROMO was merely reflecting an expectation that the conditions in the market 
were such that the funds rate to deviate from the target level.  In all such instances, other 
statements in the ROMO (or BB and occasionally the transcripts) that suggested the 
                                                 
2 See Transcript, March 1984, meeting, p. 87. 
  3target had or had not changed were considered in determining whether the target was 
changed.  In instances where an apparent intermeeting target change is followed by a 
meeting of the FOMC, the transcript and the BB for that meeting were used to verify the 
new target level. 
Target changes that are associated with a meeting of the FOMC are denoted by m 
following the date.  Changes associated with a conference call of the FOMC are denoted 
by c.  Meeting changes were assumed to be implemented on the next business day 
following the meeting unless the next business day is a reserve settlement day.  If the 
next business day is settlement Wednesday, the target is assumed to be implemented on 
the next business day following the settlement day unless documentary evidence, such as 
the date of the change in the IBA, suggested otherwise.  In these instances, the target 
change is assumed to be effective on the date suggested by the documentary evidence. 
With these understandings, Table 1 presents my series for the Fed’s funds rate 
target, denoted ffTarget
T, for the period September 27, 1983 through December 1993.  
Beginning in 1994, the FOMC began announcing target changes, so there is no difficulty 
in identifying the Fed’s funds rate target after 1993.  Table 1 also presents an alternative 
target series found in Thornton and Wheelock (2000) beginning on July 20, 1983, 
denoted ffTarget
A.
3  The amount of the change in the discount rate is also presented in 
instances when the discount rate and the funds rate target were simultaneously changed. 
The last column of the table presents a description the reason for determining the 
date and amount of each target change.  In instances where my series differs from that 
presented in Thornton and Wheelock (2000), I state why I believe the new series more 
                                                 
3 See Thornton and Wheelock (2000), Appendix B for the sources of these data and Appendix B, 
Table B2 for another series provided by the FOMC Secretariat beginning on May 24, 1983. 
 
  4correctly identifies the date and magnitude of the change.  The differences are relatively 
minor.  Hence, it is doubtful that the series would generate significantly different results 
in most applied work.  Moreover, the series are identical after October 1989. 
Because discretion was used to determine whether the target had or had not 
changed and the amount of the change, especially relatively early on in the new operating 
procedure, I attempted to provide enough information that the user can decide to accept 
or reject my determination in instances where the series differ with respect to either the 
date and/or magnitude of the change.  Fortunately, such instances are rare. 
There are a couple of instances were there is a difference of opinion about a target 
change that are particularly interesting.  One occurred with the 25-basis point decrease 
that I maintain occurred on October 19, 1989.  The New York Fed maintains that this 
change occurred on the 16
th, the alternative series indicates that the change occurred on 
the 18
th, while a series provided by the FOMC Secretariat (see Poole, Rasche, and 
Thornton, 2002 for the Secretariat’s series) suggest that the change occurred on the 19
th.  
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) analyze the ROMO and suggest that it supports the 
Secretariat’s date.  Nevertheless, they use the 16
th because the Desk injected reserves on 
the 16
th when the funds rate was declining.  Chairman Greenspan’s closing remarks 
during the October 18 conference call make it clear, however, that the easier policy was 
not implemented until the 19
th. 
Another occurred in July 1989.  The new and alternative series suggest that this 
change occurred on July 7, the day after an FOMC meeting while the Secretariat suggests 
that the change occurred on the 6
th—the day of the meeting.  Poole, Rasche, and 
Thornton (2002) note that the “the market viewed the Desk’s failure to act on July 6, 
  5when the funds rate was trading significantly below its previous trading level, as a policy 
action.”
4  Because of this and the fact that federal funds futures rates responded 
significantly on the 6
th, Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) accept the Secretariat’s 
dating of this action.  However, the facts that (1) this decision occurred at an FOMC 
meeting, (2) the decision to change the target was made late in the day after the Desk had 
completed its operations for the day, and (3) the IBA  was not increased until the 7
th, 
make it all but certain that the change occurred on the 7
th. 
These instances indicate how difficult it can be to date the target changes even as 
late as 1989.  This is why I was careful in constructing this new series.  Nevertheless, as 
with any data series, the responsibility lies with the user.   
                                                 
4 Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002), p. 74. 
  6Poole, W., R.H. Rasche, and D.L. Thornton. (2002) “Market Anticipations of Monetary 
Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 84(4), 65-93. 
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  7Table 1: New Series on the FOMC’s Target for the Federal Funds Rate, September 27, 1982 – December 31, 1993 
Date  ffTarget
T  ffTarget
A  DR      Notes
09/27/1982c  10.25      At the conference call Volcker suggested that with the change being proposed the funds 
rate would trade “comfortably” in the 10 to 10.5 percent range. 
10/01/1982  10      The Oct. 6 ROMO indicates that the IBA was reduced by 50 as of Oct. 1, and that the 
funds rate was expected to trade around the discount rate (10 percent). 
10/7/1982        9.5 Oct  13  ROMO indicates that the IBA was reduced by $200 million from $500 million to 
$300 million at the beginning of the maintenance period and that the funds rate was 
expected to trade around the 9.5.  This discount rate was reduced to 9.5 percent on the 
12
th. 
11/19/1982m  9    -.5  The discount rate cut was announced “late in the day” on Friday, Nov. 19 to take effect 
on Monday, Nov. 22.  The Nov. 24 ROMO indicates that the IBA was reduced by $50 
million to $250 million. 
12/14/1982  8.5    -.5  Discount rate cut was announced late in the day on the 13
th.  The ROMO indicates that 
the IBA was reduced by $50 million in response to the discount rate cut on Dec. 15. 
03/31/1983m  8.625      There is some evidence that the rate was expected to trade slightly above 8.5 percent 
prior to this date.  However, the IBA was increase by $50 million at the FOMC’s 
direction and the rate is confirmed by the March BB. 
05/25/1983m  8.75      The May 25 ROMO noted that “Following Tuesday’s Committee meeting, the 
nonborrowed reserve objective for the week effectively was reduced by $100 million to 
take account of the higher borrowing allowance selected” by the Committee.  The target 
rate is confirmed by the May BB. 
06/24/1983c  9      The June 29 ROMO reports that the IBA was increased by $100 million after the 
conference call, and that “It was anticipated that a Federal funds rate of 9 percent or a bit 
higher would be associated with the interim objective.” 
07/14/1983m  9.25      The July 20 ROMO indicates that the IBA was increased to $700 million from $450 
million and that the funds rate is expected to be in the range of 9.25 to 9.5 percent.  
However, the BB suggests that a borrowing range of $500 to $700 implied a funds rate in 
the range of 9 to 9.5 percent. 
07/20/1983       9.4375 9.375 July  27  ROMO indicates that “in view of the perceived relatively high bank borrowing 
  8demands and the Committee’s intent to achieve slightly firmer reserve conditions,” the 
IBA was increased by $50 million on the first day of the new maintenance period, and 
that the funds rate was expected to continue to trade in the 9.375 to 9.5 percent range. 
07/27/1983    9.4375    This target was clearly put into effect by or before July 20. 
08/11/1983  9.5625      The Aug. 10 ROMO reported that the funds rate was expected to be “in the 9 1/2 percent 
area, possibly with some trading at 9 5/8 percent.”  However, it was the Aug. 17 ROMO 
that reported that “It was expected that this degree of reserve pressure would continue to 
be associated with Federal funds trading mostly in the area of 9 1/2 to 9 5/8 percent,” 
suggesting that this was the new target. 
08/17/1983  9.5  9.5625    The Aug. 24 ROMO indicates that “It was expected that this amount of reserve 
availability would be associated with a Federal funds rate in the 9 1/2 percent area.” 
08/24/1983m       9.5 The  FOMC  transcripts indicate that the Committee expected 9.5 funds rate, which is 
confirmed by Aug 31 ROMO.  However, there is no adjustment to the IBA.  Moreover, 
the Aug. 24 ROMO indicates that this target was already in effect. 
09/15/1983  9.375      The Sept 14 ROMO indicated that in wake of the Sept. 8 conference call, the Committee 
expected the funds rate to decline.  The Sept. 21 ROMO indicates that the IBA was 
reduced by $50 million on the 15
th and that this was expected to be associated with a 
funds rate a shade under 9.5 percent.  The Sept. 28 and Oct. 5 ROMOs confirm the 9.375 
target. 
10/05/1983       9.375 It  appears  that  the target was changed earlier. 
03/01/1984     9.5 
03/15/1984       9.875
03/22/1984     10 
It is not clear that the target was changed on these dates.  There was no change in the 
IBA during this period.  Moreover, the Feb. 29 ROMO stated that “this degree of reserve 
availability was thought to be consistent with a Federal funds rate around the upper end 
of the 9 1/4 to 9 1/2 percent range,” suggesting that 9.375 was the effective target for the 
funds rate, and the March 7 ROMO noted the funds rate was higher, but this appeared to 
be unintentional.  The March 7 ROMO noted that “that amount of borrowed reserves was 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading somewhat more consistently above 
9 1/2 percent than below that level because of uncertainties related to reserve availability 
and possibly because of a lessened use of the discount window under CRR.”  The 
unintentional nature of the recent funds rate was noted again in the March 14 ROMO 
  9which stated, “Recent experience suggested that this degree of reserve availability would 
be consistent with a Federal funds rate of 9 1/2 percent or somewhat higher.”  Again this 
was suggested by the March 21 ROMO which stated, “Given the pressures associated 
with the corporate tax date on March 15 and subsequent end of quarter pressures, it was 
the Account Management’s view, as the period began, the Federal funds rate might 
average in a range of 9 ¾ to 10 percent over the period.” 
03/29/1984m  10.5     10.25 The  April  3  ROMO indicates that the IBA was increased to $1 billion after the meeting 
and both the transcripts and BB suggest that the FOMC was expecting a 10.5 funds rate.  
However, the April 3 ROMO states “This degree of reserve restraint was expected to be 
associated with Federal funds trading in about a 10 to 10 1/2 percent range…”  However, 
the April 11 and subsequent ROMOs, suggest the target was 10.5 percent.   
04/05/1984       10.5 The  transcripts,  ROMOs, and the BB suggest the earlier dating of this target change. 
06/14/1984    10.625    It does not appear that the target was changed.  There was no change in the IBA and the 
June 20 ROMO states “Even if borrowing averaged about $l billion in the second week it 
was expected that pressures associated with the June tax payment date would cause 
Federal funds to trade somewhat above 10 1/2 percent during the week,” suggesting that 
the higher rate was unintentional.  
06/21/1984    11    It does not appear that the target was changed on this date.  The higher funds rate appears 
to be due to circumstances rather than intent.  The July 4 ROMO stated that “Given a 
comfortable excess reserve position for banks at the beginning of the week, it was 
expected that Federal funds would trade in a range closer to 10 1/2 percent, compared to 
the average of 11.27 percent in the first week of the interval.” 
07/05/1984  11      Despite an unchanged IBA the July 11 ROMO suggests that the funds rate “is likely to 
trade in a range around 11 percent.”  The July 11 ROMO also notes that the Desk took no 
action on the 5
th or the 6
th in spite of the fact that the funds rate was in the range of 11 to 
11.375 percent on those days.  The explicit lack of action when the funds rate was 
trading above the previous target suggests that the target was raised. 
07/19/1984m  11.25  11.25    The Committee voted to maintain the existing degree of reserve pressure and there was 
no change in IBA.  Nevertheless, all of the documents suggest the Fed expected a higher 
funds rate.  The new level is difficult to determine.  The BB and the transcripts suggest 
that the FOMC expected the funds rate to be about 11.125 percent.  However, the July 25 
  10ROMO states that “The degree of restraint implied by the reserve objectives was 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in a range around 11 1/4 percent.”  
The Aug. 1 and 8 ROMOs confirm the 11.25 percent rate. 
08/09/1984  11.5  11.5625    The Aug. 8 and 15 ROMOs suggest that the target change occurred on Aug. 9.  The Aug. 
15 ROMO states that “The degree of restraint implied by the reserve objective was 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in a range around 11 1/2 percent…”  
The FOMC affirmed this target at its Aug. 21 meeting, when the Committee voted for a 
$100 million reduction in the IBA.  The rate is also confirmed on p. 43 of the transcripts 
when Volcker notes that the equilibrium funds rate (without the reduction in the IBA) is 
11.75.  The Desk Data indicates that the reduction in the IBA did not occur until Aug. 
31, however. 
08/30/1984    11.4375    The reduction in the IBA occurred on August 31.  However, the Sept. 5, 1984 ROMO 
notes that the funds rate was expected trade “a bit below 11 1/2 percent, once pressures 
associated with the holiday weekend subsided.  This language was repeated Sept. 12, 
1984 ROMO; however, the Sept. 19 ROMO makes suggests that the target was 11.5 
percent.   
09/20/1984       11.25 11.25 The  Sept.  19  ROMO notes that the IBA was reduced $ 50 million and the Desk Data 
shows that this occurred on Sept. 13.  However, the Sept. 19 ROMO indicated that the 
funds rate will “continue” to trade in the 11.5 percent range “or possibly a shade lower.”  
The Sept. 26 ROMO, however, notes that “It was expected that Federal funds would 
trade in a range of 11 to 11 1/2 percent.” 
09/27/1984        11 11 Oct.  3  ROMO notes that the IBA was reduced by $ 100 million and the Desk Data shows 
that this occurred on Sept. 27.  Moreover, the Oct. 3 ROMO indicates that “the reserve 
objectives were expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in the neighborhood 
of 11 percent.” 
10/04/1984    10.5625    While the transcript clearly indicates a preference to ease, there was no reduction in the 
IBA and the Oct. 10 ROMO suggested that the degree of reserve pressure would 
normally be associated with 11 percent on the funds rate, but it could go as low as 10.5 to 
10.625.  Moreover, the Oct. BB suggests the low side of 11.  The Oct. 10 ROMO states 
“The Account Management noted that the $750 million path borrowing level might 
ordinarily be expected to be associated with a Federal funds rate in the area of 11 
  11percent. However, because of the weight of excesses accumulated in the first week of the 
period, it was felt the funds rate might trade in the area of 10 1/2 to 10 5/8 percent or 
even sink lower.”  Hence, it appears that the lower funds rate was circumstantial rather 
than intentional. 
10/11/1984  10.5  10.5    Even though there was no change in the IBA, the Oct. 17 ROMO stated “It was expected 
that Federal funds would tend to trade around 10 1/2 percent or a shade higher, given the 
easier tone that had emerged at the end of the previous maintenance period, although 
some uncertainty surrounded that expectation.” 
10/18/1984  10  10    Whether the target changed on this date is difficult to say, but it seems likely that it did if 
only tacitly.  The Oct. 24 ROMO noted that given the IBA of $750 million, “achieving 
the two-week borrowing average ($750 million) implied average borrowing in the 
second week of about $600 million after the high borrowing in the first week.”  The Oct. 
24 ROMO notes that this fact, combined with possibility that the demand for excess 
reserves might be on the low side, “might lead to Federal funds rate trading at around 10 
percent or a shade lower.”  The Oct. 30 ROMO notes the uncertainty about the Desk 
ability to hit its new target saying, “Given the recent sharp rate movements and uncertain 
relationship between borrowing and money market conditions, the Desk ventured, with 
more uncertainty than usual, that Federal funds might trade roughly in the area around 10 
percent.” 
11/08/1984m        9.5 9.5 Transcripts  suggest  a clear intent to ease—“half way between A and B.”  The Nov. BB 
indicates that half way between A and B was half way between 9 and 10 percent.  This 
rate is confirmed by the Nov. 14 ROMO. 
11/23/1984        9 9 -.5 The  ROMO suggested that the funds rate would trade around 9 percent in wake of 
discount rate cut.  Desk data indicates that the IBA was reduced by $75 million on this 
day. 
12/06/1984  8.75  8.75    Confirmed by Dec 12 ROMO.  Desk Data indicates that the IBA was reduced by $100 
million to $400 million. 
12/19/1984m  8.5      The lower target is confirmed by Dec 26 ROMO.  Desk data indicates that the IBA was 
reduced by $100 million on the 19
th, a settlement Wednesday.  Consequently, I date the 
target change on this day. 
  1212/20/1984    8.5    The change in the IBA suggests that this rate was put into effect on Dec. 19. 
12/24/1984      8.125   -.5 Dec  26  ROMO suggested the funds rate would fall in response to discount rate cut.  This 
target is supported by the Jan. 2 ROMO. The discount rate cut was announced late on 
Friday, December 21 to take effect on Monday, December 24. 
12/27/1984       8.125 The  evidence  suggest the change occurred on the 24
th. 
01/24/1985      8.25 8.25  Jan.  30  ROMO notes that on the 24
th the IBA was changed from “up to $300 million” to 
$300 million, indicating a slight firming of reserve pressure.  However, the ROMO notes 
that “it was expected that Federal funds would continue to trade around the recent 
average level of roughly 8 1/4 percent,” suggesting that the change may have occurred 
earlier.  The previous ROMO clearly indicates that the target was 8.125 percent, 
however. 
02/14/1985m  8.375  8.375    The Desk Data shows that the IBA was increased by $50 million on the 14
th.  Moreover, 
the Feb. 20 ROMO notes that “it was anticipated that Federal funds would trade in a 
range of 8 1/4 to 8 1/2 percent.” 
02/21/1985       8.5
03/21/1985       8.625
The Feb. 27 and subsequent ROMOs clearly indicate that the Desk expected the funds 
rate to trade above 8.5 percent, it is not at all clear that this was intentional.  While it is 
difficult to say for sure, it appears that the ROMO statements during this period do not 
reflect a change in policy, but merely the recognition that the funds rate would likely be 
trading somewhat higher than expected by the FOMC.  Indeed, the March 20 ROMO 
notes that “Given the taut money market tone at the close of the previous period and the 
likelihood of pressure around the March 15 corporate tax date, it appeared likely that 
Federal funds would trade in a somewhat higher range for a time in the new reserve 
period, initially close to 9 percent or even a little higher.” 
03/28/1985  8.5  8.5    The April 3 ROMO notes that “following discussions at the recent FOMC meeting, the 
paths incorporated an increased allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing of 
$400 million—up from $350 million…It seemed likely that Federal funds would trade 
around 8 1/2 percent, with the rate somewhat higher in the first few days of the period 
due to quarter-end pressures.”  The 8.5 percent target was reaffirmed by the April 10 
ROMO. 
04/18/1985    8.375    This may have been a target change.  The April 24 ROMO noted “The Desk noted that 
  13the $400 million borrowing gap would ordinarily be associated with Federal funds 
trading in the area of 8 1/4 to 8 1/2 percent.  But in light of recent experience including 
the large buildup of excess reserves early in the period, Federal funds were expected to 
trade around 8 1/4 percent or lower for a few days.” 
04/25/1985  8.25  8.25    The May 1, ROMO indicates that “With this degree of reserve pressure, Federal funds 
were expected to trade in the area of 8 1/4 percent.” This target was reaffirmed in the 
May 8 and May 15 ROMOs.  The IBA was increased by $50 million on the 25
th for 
technical reasons. 
05/16/1985    8.125    It does not appear that the target was changed on this day.  Rather, it appears that the 
lower rate was expected on the basis of widespread market expectations of a cut in the 
discount rate.  The May 22 ROMO notes that “It was expected that Federal funds would 
trade largely around 8 to 8 1/4 percent with this degree of reserve pressure and a discount 
rate of 8 percent—but with widespread expectations that a lower discount rate might be 
in the offing.” 
05/20/1985  7.75  7.75  -.5  The new target was confirmed in the May 22 ROMO.  The funds rate was expected to 
fall to 7.75 percent following the discount rate cut, which was announced late of Friday, 
May 17, to take effect on Monday, May 20. The IBA was reduced by $100 million on 
May 22 for technical reasons. 
07/11/1985  7.6875  7.6875    It is not entirely clear that the new target was established on this date; however, the 
language of the ROMO suggests this dating.  The July 17 ROMO uses somewhat 
ambiguous language, noting only that “It was expected that Federal funds would trade 
around 7 5/8 to 7 3/4 percent.”  The July 24 ROMO uses more definitive language, 
stating that “Given the indicated degree of reserve pressure, it was expected that Federal 
funds would trade around 7 5/8 to 7 3/4 percent.”  The earlier date was chosen. 
07/25/1985  7.75  7.75    The July 31 ROMO notes that “Given this degree of reserve pressure, it was expected 
that Federal funds would trade around 7 3/4 percent,” suggesting a new funds rate target. 
08/21/1985m  7.8125      The Desk Data shows IBA increase by $25 million on the 21
st.  This change was 
confirmed by Aug 21 ROMO which stated “With the small borrowing adjustment it was 
expected that Federal funds would trade mostly in the area of 7 3/4 to 7 7/8 percent.” 
08/22/1985    7.8125    The evidence suggested that the increased occurred on the 21
st. 
  1408/29/1985       7.875 The  Sept.  4  ROMO clearly indicates that the Desk expect the funds rate to average about 
this level.  It does not appear that the target was changed as the ROMO notes only that 
“Federal funds were expected to trade largely in a 7 3/4 to 8 percent range.” 
09/06/1985  8  8    This adjustment noted in Sept 11 ROMO, which noted that “It was expected that Federal 
funds would trade around 8 percent, given the new degree of reserve pressure.”  The 
Desk Data shows IBA increased by $100 million on the 6
th. 
12/18/1985m  7.75  7.75    Confirmed by Dec 18 ROMO, which notes that “It was expected that the reserve 
objective would be consistent with Federal funds trading around 7 3/4 percent…”  Desk 
Data shows that the IBA reduced by $50 million on this date. 
03/07/1986  7.25  7.25  -.5  Confirmed in the March 12 ROMO that after the discount rate cut the funds rate was 
expected to trade around 7.25 percent.  The IBA was unchanged, however. 
04/02/1986m  7.3215      While the April 9 ROMO continued to say 7.25 or slightly higher.  However, the 7.3215 
rate is confirmed by both the April transcript, when President Guffey said “I hate to ask 
this question, Mr. Chairman, but I assume that the latter implies a 7-1/4 to 7-3/8 percent 
funds rate or thereabouts.”  It is also confirmed by the BB for the April meeting. 
04/10/1986    7.125    It seems unlikely that there was a policy change on this date.  The April 16 ROMO notes 
that “While that level of borrowing previously had been associated with Federal funds 
trading around 7 l/4 percent or slightly higher, the market’s expectation of further official 
accommodation was thought likely to lead funds to trade in a 7 to 7 1/14 percent range.” 
04/17/1986    7    It is unclear whether the 7 percent is a new target or the consequence of the market’s 
expectation of a cut in the discount rate.  The April 23 ROMO states “Initially it was 
anticipated that the objective would be associated with Federal funds trading close to 7 
percent, with expectations of discount rate action apparently distorting the normal 
relationships.” 
04/21/1986  6.75    -.5  The April 23 ROMO reports that after the cut, which was announced late on Friday, 
April 18 to be effective on Monday April, 21, a lower trading range was expected to 
“emerge eventually.”  The 6.75 target was confirmed by the April 30 ROMO. 
04/24/1986    6.75    Evidence suggest that this change occurred on April 21. 
05/22/1986m  6.8125  6.8125    The target is confirmed by June 4 ROMO, which reports that” This degree of reserve 
pressure was expected to be associated with Federal funds trading mostly in a 6 3/4 to 6 
  157/8 percent range.  This target is also confirmed by the May BB. 
06/05/1986  6.875  6.875    There was no change in the IBA; however, the wording of the June 18, ROMO, which 
states that “this degree of reserve pressure was expected to be associated with Federal 
funds trading mostly about 6 7/8 percent,” suggests that the target was changed on this 
date. 
07/11/1986m  6.375  6.375  -.5  This target change is confirmed by July 16 ROMO; however, there was no change in the 
IBA.  Even thought this occurred 2 days after the FOMC meeting it is associated with a 
meeting because the transcript indicates that the Committee clearly wanted to ease and 
anticipated a discount rate cut which was presented as a fait accompli. 
08/14/1986    6.3125    It is unclear whether this is a change in policy or simply reflects the Desk’s expectations 
based on the widespread expectation of another discount rate cut. The Aug. 27 ROMO 
states that “The degree of reserve pressure embodied in the path over the first week of 
the period was believed to be associated with Federal funds trading at around 6 1/4 to 6 
3/8 percent, possibly toward the low end given market anticipations of a policy move and 
the element of special situation borrowing that was at that time included in the path 
allowance.” 
08/21/1986m        5.875 5.875 -.5 This  target  change is confirmed by Aug 27 ROMO.  This change is associated with an 
FOMC meeting because the transcript indicates that the Committee clearly wanted to 
ease and anticipated a discount rate cut.  In this case, the discount rate cut was not 
presented as a fait accompli and some Committee members expressed concerns about 
“contingency” policymaking. 
12/04/1986    6    There does not appear to have been a policy change on this date.  The Dec. 17 ROMO 
states “This degree of reserve pressure would normally have been expected to be 
associated with Federal funds trading around 5 7/8 percent, but recent experience and 
seasonal pressures were expected to result in trading more often around 6 percent or a bit 
higher.”  This statement is reiterated in the Dec. 31 ROMO. 
01/05/1987  6      The timing of this change is very difficult to determine.  The Jan. 14 ROMO noted that 
“Year-end pressures in the money market were expected to diminish with time, but it 
was uncertain how quickly. Once they subsided, the degree of reserve pressure being 
fostered was expected to be associated with Federal funds trading around 6 percent or a 
bit lower.”  This language suggests that the Desk was fostering reserve pressure 
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implemented is January 5, which was the first Monday of the new year.  Although, it 
could have happened on Friday, January 2.  This objective for the funds rate was 
confirmed by the Jan 28 ROMO, which stated “This degree of reserve pressure was 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in the area of 6 percent.”  The 6 
percent target was later confirmed by the Feb. transcript and the Feb. BB when the 
Committee voted for an unchanged degree of reserve pressure. 
04/30/1987c  6.5  6.5    Confirmed by May 6 ROMO.  Desk Data shows that the IBA was increased by $100 
million on this day. 
05/21/1987    6.75    The IBA was not increased until the 22
nd. 
05/22/1987m  6.75      Confirmed by June 3 ROMO, which stated that “This degree of reserve pressure was 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in the area of 6 3/4 percent.”  Desk 
Data, however, shows that the IBA was not increased until the 22
nd, two days after the 
meeting, so it is dated as occurring on the 22
nd, but it could have occurred on the 21
st. 
07/02/1987  6.625  6.625    The July 15 ROMO stated “This degree of reserve pressure was initially expected to be 
associated with Federal funds trading around 6 1/2 to 6 3/4 percent, perhaps more toward 
the lower end of this range.” 
08/27/1987  6.75  6.75    The Sept. 9 ROMO stated that “With the degree of reserve pressure expected at the 
outset of the period, the Desk anticipated that Federal funds would trade around 6 3/4 
percent,” suggesting that this was the new target. 
09/03/1987  6.875  6.875    The Sept. 9 ROMO states that “Following the increase in the borrowing allowance, the 
Desk expected trading in a range of 6 3/4 to 7 percent…” Desk Data shows that the IBA 
increased by $100 million on the 3
rd. 
09/04/1987  7.25  7.25  .5  Confirmed by the Sept 9 ROMO.  Discount rate announcement was early on this day.   
09/24/1987  7.3125  7.3125    The Oct. 7 ROMO stated that “The anticipated degree of reserve restraint was expected 
to be associated with Federal funds trading in a range of about 7 1/4 to 7 3/8 percent,” 
suggesting this was the new target. 
10/22/1987    7.125    It is not clear that the target had changed on this day.  The Nov. 4 ROMO notes that 
borrowing was reduced from $600 million to $500 million at the start of “at the start of 
the period.”  However, the Deck Data indicates that this occurred on the second day of 
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rd.  The IBA was reduced again by $50 million on Oct. 28; 
however, the Nov. 4 ROMO characterizes both of these changes as technical in nature, 
noting that “The adjustments were viewed as tentative in recognition of current financial 
market developments.”  The Nov. 4 ROMO made no statement about the expect funds 
rate, noting instead that “Federal funds remained firm but volatile through most of the 
first week, trading in the broad range of around 6 7/8 to 7 5/16 percent.” 
10/28/1987    7    See the previous explanation. 
11/04/1987m  6.8125  6.8125    The new target is confirmed by the BB and the Nov. 18 ROMO, which stated that “It was 
anticipated that this degree of reserve pressure would be associated with Federal funds 
trading around 6 3/4 to 6 7/8 percent.”  Desk Data indicates that the IBA reduced by $50 
million on this day. 
01/28/1988  6.625  6.625    New target confirmed by the Feb. 10 ROMO.  Desk Data confirms that the IBA was 
reduced by $50 million on this day. 
02/11/1988m  6.5  6.5    Even though the directive was symmetric, the FOMC transcripts note that Greenspan 
indicates that this “implies a funds rate of roughly 6-1/2 percent,” and asks if there any 
disagreement among FOMC members.  The new target is confirmed by the Feb. 24 
ROMO.  Desk Data confirms that the IBA was reduced by $50 million on this day. 
03/30/1988m  6.75  6.75    Then new target is confirmed by the April 6 ROMO. Desk Data confirms that the IBA 
was increased by $100 million on this day. 
05/09/1988  7  7    New target is reported in May 18 ROMO in response to a conference call on May 6.  The 
ROMO states that “With the slightly higher degree of reserve pressure indicated by the 
higher borrowing target, it was anticipated that Federal funds would trade around 7 
percent, an increase from the 6 3/4 percent area expected at the start of the period.  There 
is no transcript of the conference call; however, both the Desk Data and the ROMO 
indicate that the IBA was increased by $100 million on this day. 
05/25/1988  7.25  7.25    The new target is reported in the June 1 ROMO, which notes that “With the slightly 
higher degree of reserve pressure indicated by the new borrowing target, it was expected 
that Federal funds would trade around 7 1/4 percent, an increase from the 7 percent area 
expected at the beginning of the period.”  Desk Data confirms that the IBA was increased 
by $100 million on this day. 
  1806/22/1988c  7.4375  7.5    There is no transcript of this conference call; however, it is mentioned on p. 59 of June 
FOMC transcript.  The new target rate of 7.4375 percent is confirmed by the June 29 
ROMO, which reports that the “adjustment was made after a telephone conference at 
which the Committee was informed of a decision to accept the pressures that had 
emerged in the money market that saw Federal funds in the 7 3/8 to 7 1/2 percent area.  
Desk Data confirms that the IBA was increased by $50 million on this day. 
07/01/1988m  7.5      The new target is confirmed by July 13 ROMO, which reports that “With this degree of 
reserve pressure, it was anticipated that Federal funds would trade in the area of 7 1/2 
percent…”  The Desk Data indicates that the IBA was increased by $50 million on this 
day. 
07/19/1988c  7.6875  7.6875    The FOMC seems to have increased the target in response to market pressures.  The July 
27 ROMO notes that “At the beginning of the period, it was 
expected that Federal funds trading would ease to the area of 7 1/2 percent or a shade 
higher from the elevated levels that characterized the close of the previous period. 
However, funds traded between 7 3/4 and 7 7/8 percent through most of the period, 
despite the Desk’s efforts to encourage somewhat lower rates by providing reserves 
relatively generously in relation to statistical needs and permitting excess reserves to run 
well above the usual allowance… As noted in the Committee conference call on July 19, 
market psychology acted to raise the anticipated range for Fed funds to 7 5/8 to 7 3/4 
percent.” 
08/08/1988c  7.75  7.75    Reported in Aug 10 ROMO, which notes that “With incoming data suggesting continued 
economic strength and attendant inflationary risks, the borrowing objective was raised to 
$700 million following the Committee conference call on August 5 and it was 
anticipated that funds would trade in the area of 7 3/4 percent or slightly higher.  The 
Desk Data confirms that the IBA was increased by $100 million to $700 million on the 
8
th and then reduced back to $600 on the 9
th when the discount rate was raised by .5. 
08/09/1988  8.125  8.125  .5  Supported by a July 20 conference call and the Aug. 10 ROMO, which notes that “With 
the change in the discount rate, the borrowing level was returned to $600 million, and it 
was expected that funds would trade in a range of 8 to 8 1/4 percent. The new target is 
also supported by the Aug. and Sept. BBs.  This is also confirmed by the Aug. 10 ROMO. 
10/20/1988    8.25    The target does not appear to have changed on this day.  The higher rate seems to reflect 
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this degree of reserve pressure, it was expected that Federal funds would trade in a range 
between 8 and 8 1/4 percent, though with trading centered more around the 8 1/4 percent 
level, as in the previous maintenance period.”  The Nov. 16 ROMO makes a similar 
statement, noting that “This degree of reserve pressure might normally have been 
expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in a range between 8 and 8 1/4 
percent. It was recognized, however, that at least initially trading would center around 8 
1/4 percent, the rate that had prevailed for most of the previous period.” 
11/17/1988  8.3125  8.3125    Whether the target changed on this day is questionable.  The Nov. 30 ROMO states that 
“The borrowing allowance was considered as tentative, because recent experience 
suggested that $600 million of borrowing might well be associated with Federal funds 
rates appreciably above recent levels. In view of this, and pending further consideration, 
the Desk decided, initially, to approach reserve needs with an anticipation that Federal 
funds would trade near recent levels, at about 8 1/4 to 8 3/8 percent.”  I assume that it 
changed on the basis of the fact that the Desk appears to have at least acquiesced to the 
rate, presumably the blessing of the Chairman. 
11/22/1988c  8.375  8.375    The new target is confirmed by the Nov. 30 ROMO, which noted that “Given this degree 
of reserve pressure, Federal funds were expected to trade around 8 3/8 percent.”  The 
IBA was reduced by $200 million on the advice of the Chairman for technical reasons. 
12/15/1988m  8.6875  8.6875    The new target is confirmed by the Dec. 28 ROMO, which indicated that “This degree of 
reserve pressure was expected to be associated with Federal funds trading in an 8 5/8 to 8 
3/4 percent range.”  The Desk Data indicates that the IBA was increased by $100 on this 
day.  It is also confirmed by the Feb. 1 ROMO. 
12/29/1988    8.75    There is no evidence in the ROMO, BB, or Desk Data suggesting that the target was 
changed on this date. 
01/05/1989  9  9    This is confirmed by the ROMO for Feb. 1 which notes that “Over the period since the 
last FOMC meeting on December 14, the Desk sought to effect the two-stage increase in 
the degree of reserve restraint adopted at the meeting. Accordingly, the borrowing 
allowance was increased by $100 million following the meeting (Dec. 15) and by an 
additional $100 million on January 5 to $600 million.” 
02/09/1989m  9.125  9.0625    The Feb.22 ROMO reports that “the Desk continued to approach the borrowing 
  20allowance with flexibility in light of the persistent uncertainty about the relationship 
between borrowing and the Federal funds rate…The initial degree of reserve pressure 
(prior to the $100 million increase in the IBA on Feb. 14) was expected to be associated 
with Federal funds trading in a range of 9 to 9 1/8 percent, or perhaps a bit higher as a 
carryover from the previous period’s close.”  This is consistent with the discussion at the 
Feb. 8 FOMC meeting in response to President Melzer’s inquiry about the current 
objective for the funds rate, Govern Johnson responded 9 – 9 1/8.  Chairman Greenspan 
corrected Johnson, saying “I would say 9 1/8 percent would be a little closer.” 
02/14/1989        9.3125 9.3125 The  ROMO for March 22 reports the intermeeting move on Feb. 14 when the IBA was 
increased to $ 700 million.  This is confirmed by the March BB and the Desk Data. 
2/23/1989      9.5625 The  March  22  ROMO notes that “Reserve pressures were again firmed on February 23 
when the borrowing allowance was tentatively raised to $800 million, to be reviewed at a 
Committee conference call that afternoon, with Federal funds expected to trade in the 
area of 9 1/2 to 9 5/8 percent.”  The Desk data shows that the IBA was reduced back to $ 
700 million on the 24
th after being increased to $800 million on the previous day.  There 
is no transcript of the conference call.  I believe this to be a temporary adjustment by the 
Desk to reserve pressures, not a change in the target. 
02/24/1989        9.75 9.75 .5 The  March  BB notes that the “federal funds rate was moved up to average a little above 
9-3/4 percent” in association with the increase in the discount rate. 
05/04/1989    9.8125    There is evidence that the funds rate was allowed to trade above 9.75 percent prior to the 
May 16 meeting.  It is not clear whether this constituted a formal change in the target, 
and, if so, when the target was changed.  The May 10 ROMO noted that “informal 
adjustments were made for above—path demand in the April 5 and May 3 maintenance 
periods and below—path demand in the April 19 period. Federal funds were expected to 
trade at 9 3/4 percent or a shade higher.”  Hence, the change could have occurred before 
May 4.  At the May FOMC meeting in response to Vice-Chairman Corrigan’s statement 
that “the market views that policy as the funds rate in the 9-3/4 to 9-7/8 percent area, 
Chairman Greenspan responded, “Basically, the funds rate has averaged 9-3/4 to 9-7/8 
percent.” 
05/17/1989m  9.8125      The Committee voted to accept the funds rate in the 9-3/4 to 9-7/8 percent range at the 
May FOMC meeting.  This is reflected in the Transcripts, the May BB and the June 28 
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this meeting, it seems reasonable to date the formal change in the target on this date. 
06/06/1989c  9.5625  9.5625    This change in reflected in the June 5 Conference call, the June 28, ROMO and the June 
BB. 
07/07/1989m  9.3125  9.3125    At the July 6 FOMC meeting the Committee voted “to decrease slightly the existing 
degree of pressure on reserve positions.”  In response to a question by Governor Angel, 
Chairman Greenspan made clear that the associated funds rate was 9-1/4 to 9-3/8 
percent.  This is confirmed by the Aug. BB and Aug. 16 ROMO.  The Desk Data shows 
that the IBA was not increased until the 7
th. 
07/27/1989c  9.0625  9.0625    This change is note in the July 26 Conference Call and the Aug. 16 ROMO.  The IBA 
was reduced by $50 million on the 27
th. 
08/10/1989    9    Following the July 27 target change the funds rate tended to trade close to 9 percent.  
However, there is no indication in either the Aug. 16 ROMO or the Aug. and Sept. BBs 
that there was a change in the target or the degree of reserve pressure.  Indeed, the Sept. 
27 ROMO states that “Since the last FOMC meeting on August 22, the Desk has sought 
to maintain the existing degree of reserve pressure. The borrowing allowance remained at 
$550 million, although the Desk continued to view this allowance flexibly in light of the 
uncertain relationship between the Federal funds rate and borrowing. With this degree of 
reserve pressure, Federal funds were expected to trade in the area of 9 percent or a shade 
higher.” 
10/18/1989c    8.75    The evidence suggests the change occurred on the 19
th. 
10/19/1989c  8.75      The Nov. 1 ROMO reports that “As noted at the Committee’s October 18 conference 
call, the nonborrowed reserve objective incorporated an allowance for adjustment and 
seasonal borrowing of $400 million, a decrease of $100 million from the previous period. 
One half of the reduction reflected a shift to a slightly more accommodative policy 
stance, with the remainder representing a technical adjustment to account for the ongoing 
decline in seasonal borrowing…This new degree of reserve pressure was expected to be 
associated with Federal funds trading in the area of 8 3/4 percent.”  Greenspan concluded 
the conference call by saying, “Okay. I still would think it appropriate to have the Desk 
ease with the period starting tomorrow if nothing untoward occurs. I think we ought to 
play it loose today, in any event, and see what occurs.”  The Desk Data indicates that the 
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th. 
11/06/1989  8.5  8.5    The Nov. 15 ROMO notes that “The allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing 
incorporated in the nonborrowed reserve objective was reduced by $50 million on four 
separate occasions during the period. Three reductions were made for technical reasons 
to account for the continuing decline of seasonal borrowing (November 2, 9, and 15), 
while the remaining reduction (November 6) reflected a shift to a slightly more 
accommodative policy stance.” The change is confirmed by the Nov. BB. 
12/20/1989m  8.25  8.25    The Jan 27, 1990 ROMO reports that “the allowance for adjustment and seasonal 
borrowing incorporated in the nonborrowed reserve objective was lowered by $25 
million to $125 million on December 20, reflecting the shift to a slightly more 
accommodative policy stance that was voted at the preceding day’s Committee meeting. 
With this new degree of reserve pressure, Federal funds were expected to trade in the 
area of 8 1/4 percent, down from 8 1/2 percent earlier.” 
07/13/1990  8  8    Reported in the July 25 ROMO reports that “on the first Friday, July 13, the path 
allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing was cut to $400 million from $450 
million. This reduction was designed to lower slightly the pressures in the reserve 
markets, and followed Chairman Greenspan’s indications to the Congress that a degree 
of financial restraint appeared to have developed that was greater than anticipated or 
appropriate…Following the July 13 policy step, Federal funds were expected to trade 
around 8 percent, compared with 8 1/4percent earlier.” The IBA was reduced by $50 
million on July 13. 
10/29/1990  7.75  7.75    The Oct. 31 ROMO notes that “the Desk reduced the degree of reserve pressure on 
Monday, October 29, following Congressional agreement on a budget package. The 
allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing was lowered by $50 million to $350 
million that day, reflecting this slightly more accommodative reserve stance and a further 
reduction in seasonal borrowing. This degree of reserve pressure was expected to result 
in Federal funds trading in the area of 7 3/4 percent.” 
11/14/1990m  7.5  7.5    The Nov. 14 ROMO reported that “the Desk moved to reduce the intended degree of 
reserve pressure on Wednesday, November 14, consistent with the Committee’s decision 
at its meeting on the previous day. The allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing 
was lowered by $75 million on the last day of the period, reflecting this slightly more 
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reduction in the degree of reserve pressure was expected to result in Federal funds 
trading down from the area of 7 3/4 percent to 7 1/2 percent after a day or two, when 
pressures arising from banks’ period-end reserve management and from the settlement of 
the midquarter refunding and interest payments had subsided.” 
12/07/1990  7.25  7.25    Reported in the Dec. 12 ROMO reports that “the Desk moved to reduce the intended 
degree of reserve pressure on Friday, December 7, following the release that morning of 
unexpectedly weak employment numbers as well as recent evidence of reduced wage 
pressures and slow money growth. The allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing 
was lowered by $25 million to $125 million on that day to reflect the slightly more 
accommodative stance. This reduction in the degree of reserve pressure was expected to 
result in Federal funds trading in the area of 7 1/4 percent.” 
12/19/1990m  7  7  -.5  The Dec, 25 ROMO notes that “the Desk moved to reduce the intended degree of reserve 
pressure on Wednesday, December 19, consistent with the Committee’s decision at its 
meeting on the previous day. On December 18, after the meeting, the Board approved a 
reduction in the discount rate from 7 percent to 6 1/2 percent effective on December 19. 
Consequently, in implementing the reduction in reserve pressure, the allowance for 
adjustment and seasonal borrowing was actually increased by $25 million to $125 
million on that day. With this new degree of reserve pressure, Federal funds were 
expected to trade in the area 
of 7 percent, down from 7 1/4 percent.” 
01/09/1991c  6.75  6.75    The Jan. 9 ROMO  reports that the Desk “moved to reduce pressures slightly near the end 
of the period, after consultation with the Chairman, in light of new evidence of 
pronounced weakness in the monetary aggregates. The Desk paved the way for the move 
on the second Tuesday and confirmed it the following day—the final day of the period. 
Following the move, the funds rate would normally have been expected to trade in the 
area of 6 3/4 percent, down from 7 percent previously…In implementing this degree of 
reserve pressure, the allowance for seasonal and adjustment borrowing was lowered by 
$25 million to $100 million.” 
02/01/1991c  6.25  6.25  -.5  In the Feb. 1 conference call Chairman Greenspan announced of the Board’s plan to 
announce today a 50 basis point reduction in the discount rate to be effective on Monday 
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point [reduction] to pass through to the funds rate.” 
03/08/1991        6 6 The  March  BB noted that “on March 8, in response to data indicating that the economy 
had continued to weaken substantially into February, the borrowing allowance was 
lowered by $25 million and the Desk signaled a 25 basis point reduction in the System’s 
intended federal funds rate.” 
04/30/1991c  5.75  5.75  -.5  At the April 30 conference call Chairman Greenspan announced “Gentlemen, the Board 
has just voted to lower the discount rate by 1/2 percentage point and the Desk will reduce 
the federal funds rate by only half of it, bringing the funds rate down 25 basis points.” 
08/06/1991  5.5  5.5    The Aug. 14 notes that “on August 6, reserve pressures were eased in view of 
persistently weak monetary aggregates and signs of a sluggish recovery. The move 
followed an FOMC conference call. The path allowance for borrowing was lowered to 
$375 million, expected to be consistent with Federal funds trading in the area of 5 1/2 
percent.”  Weak M2 growth was discussed during the Aug. 5 conference call, but there 
was no decision to reduce the funds rate.  Also, the IBA had been ratcheted up to $400 
million during previous weeks in response to stronger than expected borrowing. 
09/13/1991  5.25  5.25  -.5  The Sept. 25 ROMO notes that “on September 13, 
the Federal Reserve lowered the discount rate to 5 percent from 5 1/2 percent. As 
reviewed in an FOMC conference call, Federal funds were expected to trade in the area 
of 5 1/4 percent. Since these moves reintroduced an anticipated spread between the funds 
and discount rates, the path allowance for borrowing was raised to $325 million.”  There 
is no transcript of this conference call. 
10/31/1991        5 5 The  Nov.  BB reports that “In response to signs of flagging consumer and business 
confidence and a weaker-than-expected economic recovery…the borrowing allowance 
was reduced by $25 million on Thursday, the first day of the current maintenance period.  
Consistent with this change, the expected trading area for federal funds was lowered to 5 
percent.”  This option was discussed at Oct. 30 conference call, but no decision was 
made at that time. 
11/06/1991m  4.75  4.75  -.5  At its Nov. 5 meeting the FOMC voted to “decrease somewhat the existing degree of 
pressure on reserve positions.”  Consistent with that decision, the Dec. BB reports that 
the discount rate was reduced by 50 basis points and the funds rate target was reduced by 
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12/06/1991  4.5  4.5    The Dec. 11 ROMO noted that “in the middle of the period, reserve pressures were 
lowered modestly and Federal funds were expected to trade in the area of 4 1/2 percent. 
The move followed the release of a particularly weak November payroll employment 
report and took account of a prevalent market assumption that this would result in an 
easier policy stance.”  The Desk Data shows that the IBA was reduced by $25 million on 
Dec. 6. 
12/20/1991c  4  4  -1.0  The Dec. 25 ROMO notes that “on December 20, following the announcement of a full 
percentage point cut in the discount rate to 3 1/2 percent and in line with the discussion 
at the Committee’s conference call in the morning, reserve pressures were formally 
lowered, with Federal funds expected to trade in the area of 4 percent.”  There is no 
transcript of this conference call. 
04/09/1992  3.75  3.75    The May BB notes that “reserve conditions were eased on April 9, reducing the expected 
federal funds rate to 3-3/4 percent.”  The Desk Data shows that the IBA was reduced by 
$25 million on the 9th. 
07/02/1992c  3.25  3.25  -.5  At the July 2 conference call Chairman Greenspan announced that “the Board a few 
minutes ago voted 7 to 0 to lower the discount rate from 3-l/2 to 3 percent,” and then 
noted that he intend “to allow the 50 basis point reduction in the discount rate to pass 
through fully to the funds rate.”  On July 1, the FOMC voted to “to maintain the existing 
degree of pressure on reserve positions.”  However, there was considerable sentiment to 
ease policy. 
09/04/1992        3 3 The  Oct.  BB notes that “on September 4, in response to a weak employment report and in 
the context of that had picked up to only a modest rate, the Desk signaled an easing of 
the intended federal funds rate to 3 percent.”  The Desk Data shows that the IBA was 
reduced by $25 million on the 4
th. 
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